Abstract. A free daily newspaper distributes news to readers and sells ad-space to advertisers, having private information about its audience. For a given number of distributed copies, depending on the type of audience (favorable or unfavorable), the newspaper may either have a large readership or a small readership. A large readership provides a greater return to advertisers, because ads are visualized by more people. A favorable audience has also the advantage of requiring a lower distribution cost (for a given number of distributed copies), because readers are willing to exert more effort to obtain a copy of the free newspaper and are less likely to reject a copy that is handed to them. We find that when the audience is unfavorable, the number of distributed copies and the price of ad-space coincide with those of the perfect information scenario. In contrast, if the audience is favorable, the newspaper prints extra copies to send a credible signal to the advertisers that the audience is favorable. Overprinting is not necessarily welfare-detrimental since readers benefit from the existence of additional copies.
Introduction
The boom of freely distributed newspapers has been one of the most striking changes arising in the press industry. The first modern freely distributed newspaper was released in Sweden in 1995 (the free daily "Metro") and, in less than ten years, the market of freely distributed papers has developed in an impressive way. According to the World Association of Newspapers, in 2001, the total circulation of freely distributed newspapers was already close to ten million daily copies (see Bakker, 2002) . Six years later, in 2007, the total circulation of free dailies was substantially higher, with more than forty million copies of free dailies being printed every day (Bakker, 2007) .
1 More recently, the market of free dailies is starting to stabilize as it starts to reach its maturity in some regions (like Europe, for example).
Like any other newspaper, free dailies constitute a platform between readers and advertisers.
2 To the side of readers, free dailies supply news, editorial content and advertising content, free of any charge. To the side of advertisers, free dailies provide the "eyeballs" of their readers, in exchange for advertising fees. Since advertisers' marginal revenue from advertising tends to increase with the readership of the newspaper, the larger the readership of the newspaper, the higher the advertisers' willingness to pay for an ad-insertion.
However, very often, advertisers are uncertain about the characteristics (including the size) of the newspapers' audiences, either because a single copy may be read by more than one person (multi-reading), or because a person with access to the newspaper does not necessarily have to read it. These uncertainty issues arise both in the context of paid press and free press. However, they tend to be more severe in the case of free press. 3
First, in the case of freely distributed press, readers do not pay for the newspaper and, therefore, even if the newspaper has been delivered in the reader's hands, she may simply prefer to drop it in the garbage instead of reading it. In the case of paid press, a consumer that buys the newspaper is tipically planning to read it. 4 Moreover, the extent of multireading phenomena is also more uncertain in the case of freely distributed newspapers.
While, in the case of paid press, multi-reading phenomena occur at the level of a given household or firm; in the case of free press, this issue is much more complex since free dailies are mostly distributed through public transport or public spaces and therefore it is difficult to establish the boundaries of multi-reading phenomena.
For the reasons explained above, it is common to observe a mismatch between the number of people to whom a free newspaper is delivered and the effective number of readers of this newspaper (who are the only ones that are exposed to the ad-insertions).
In this paper, we assume that the newspaper is more informed than advertisers about the magnitude of the mismatch between circulation and readership. The rationale for this asymmetric information assumption lies on the fact that free dailies tend to be more informed than advertisers about their own distribution system: they control the type and location of the distribution points (vendors delivering the newspaper in hand or stands where readers pick up a copy of the newspaper); and they have information on how people react to the distribution of the newspaper.
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In situations of asymmetric information between advertisers and the freely distributed newspaper, the former may try to infer the type of audience from the number of copies that are distributed: in principle, the higher the number of distributed copies of the newspaper, the larger should be its readership. However, advertisers should be aware that free newspapers can distribute extra copies to manipulate their beliefs about the audience and increase their willingness to pay for ad-insertions.
In this paper, we study under what circumstances asymmetric information between advertisers and free dailies may lead to overprinting. To pursue this investigation, we consider a monopolist free daily that provides: (i ) news and advertising to readers; and (ii ) advertising space to advertisers that are less informed than the newspaper about the type of audience of the newspaper. In particular, we consider that the newspaper's audience can be "plentiful and seeking" (favorable type) or "lacking and avoiding" (unfavorable type). The distinction between plentiful and lacking refers to the relationship between circulation and readership. For the same number of distributed copies, readership (i.e., the total number of actual readers) is larger if the audience is plentiful than if it is lacking. The distinction between seeking and avoiding refers to the relationship between circulation and distribution cost. The cost of distributing a given number of copies is lower if the audience is seeking than if it is avoiding, because, in the former case, readers are willing to exert more effort to obtain a newspaper and are less likely to reject a newspaper that is handed to them.
We study the behavior of advertisers and the monopolist newspaper in an asymmetric information game with the following structure. First, nature selects the type of audience.
Then, the newspaper observes the type of audience and chooses a publicly observable number of copies. Advertisers, who are uncertain about the type of audience, observe the free newspaper's circulation and offer bids for the available slots of ad-space. Afterwards, outcomes are realized. To characterize the equilibrium contracts proposed by the free paper contingent on the type of its audience, we rely on the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, following the method suggested by Cho and Sobel (1990) .
The paper is related to the literature dealing with the analysis of the two-sided structure of media industries (e.g. Manduchi and Picard (2009) , Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) , Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001) ). In line with these papers, our paper addresses a degenerate two-sided market, in which a one-way externality takes place (corresponding to the effect of readership on advertising demand). We contribute to this literature by introducing the possibility of asymmetric information between advertisers and a freely distributed newspaper.
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Our paper is also related to the literature on signalling and economic decisions in a context of asymmetric information (Spence (1973) , Cho and Kreps (1987) , Cho and Sobel (1990) ), from which we borrow the method to study the interaction between advertisers and the freely distributed newspaper.
The first contribution of the paper is to shed light on the adverse selection problems that may arise when a freely distributed newspaper is better informed than advertisers about its audience. If the cost of bringing additional copies to the market is sufficiently small, when advertisers observe a large number of distributed copies, they may question whether the audience is plentiful and seeking or whether the newspaper is only trying to mislead them.
The second contribution of the paper is to show that, when these adverse selection issues arise, the newspaper will use the number of copies as a signal to advertisers.
Our model unveils that, in this case, the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure strategies that survives the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) corresponds to the least-cost separating equilibrium. The characteristics of the equilibrium contract are the following: when the free daily's audience is lacking and avoiding, the newspaper does not deviate from the perfect information number of copies; otherwise, the newspaper chooses a greater number of copies than in the perfect information case. This credibly signals to advertisers that the audience is plentiful and seeking.
From a welfare perspective, we observe that, in this specific market, the costly signal (excessive number of copies) is not necessarily welfare-detrimental because it benefits parties that are external to the contracting firms (readers).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic ingredients of the model. Section 3 presents the perfect information case, as a benchmark. Section 4 characterizes the optimal contract under asymmetric information. Section 5 studies the case of endogenous ad-space. Section 6 concludes the paper with some remarks.
The model
We consider a monopolist newspaper whose activity consists in producing news that are freely distributed to readers and in selling ad-space to advertisers. Below, we describe the main ingredients of the model.
Readership
The readership of the freely distributed newspaper (i.e., the total number of readers) is given by the function R (θ, T ), where T ≥ 0 stands for the publicly observable number of copies that the newspaper decides to print and distribute and θ ∈ {θ L , θ H } is a parameter that describes the type of audience of the newspaper. In the case of plentiful and seeking readers, the audience is said to be favorable, and θ = θ H . In contrast, when readers are lacking and avoiding, the audience is said to be unfavorable, and θ = θ L .
It is reasonable to assume that the number of distributed copies is publicly observable, since there are independent bodies that audit the circulation of newspapers. 7 Regarding readership, it would be less reasonable to assume public observability, because it is hard to estimate the amount of time that people dedicate to reading the newspaper. In the case of free press, this issue tends to be even more important, because many of the individuals that obtain a copy do not read the newspaper, and also because a single copy may be read by many readers.
Assumption 1 (Readership)
The readership function, R (θ, T ), satisfies the following properties: 8 The functions R T and R T T are, respectively, the first and second-order partial derivatives of R with respect to T .
From Assumption 1, it follows that: (i ) when circulation is null, nobody reads the newspaper; (ii ) for a given number of copies, the marginal impact on readership of an additional distributed copy is positive and is greater if the audience is favorable than if it is unfavorable; (iii ) this marginal impact is decreasing with the number of distributed copies.
Advertising
On the other side of the market (advertising), the newspaper sells ad-space to the N highest bidders out of a large number of homogeneous advertisers, who competeà la Bertrand. The payoff obtained by the representative advertiser is:
where v(R) stands for the advertisers' expected return from buying an ad-insertion in the freely distributed newspaper and p stands for the price of an ad-insertion. The reservation payoff of the advertisers is normalized to zero. The assumption of homogeneous advertisers together with Bertrand competition guarantees that the newspaper is able to extract all the surplus from advertisers. 9 Therefore:
We assume that the advertisers' expected return from buying ad-space, v, is a continuous, increasing and concave function of readership, R.
Assumption 2 (Advertising return)
The advertisers' expected return, as a function of readership, satisfies the following properties:
From Assumption 2, it follows that: (i ) if nobody reads the newspaper, the expected return from advertising is null; (ii ) advertisers' expected return increases with readership;
and (iii ) this marginal effect does not increase with readership.
Since the advertising return only depends on readership, which, in turn, depends on the type of audience and on the number of distributed copies, we can write the advertising return directly as a function of the type of audience and of the number of copies. It is easy to verify that such composite function, V (θ, T ), preserves the properties of the readership function, R(θ, T ).
Proposition 1 (Advertising return)
The advertisers' expected return, as a function of the type of audience and of the number of distributed copies, satisfies the following properties:
To obtain Proposition 1, notice that: (i ) if no copies are distributed, then readership is null and, therefore, advertising return is also null; (ii ) since readership increases as the number of distributed copies increases, the advertising return also does, and these effects are greater when the audience is favorable than when it is unfavorable; (iii )
as the number of distributed copies increases, the marginal effect on readership of an additional copy becomes smaller, therefore, its marginal effect on advertising return also does (because the advertising return is a concave function of readership).
In sum, for a given number of distributed copies, distributing an additional copy has a more positive effect on advertisers' revenues when the audience is favorable (θ = θ H ) than when it is unfavorable (θ = θ L ). Accordingly, advertisers' willingness to pay for ad-space is higher when θ = θ H than when θ = θ L .
Newspaper
In the newspaper industry, production costs essentially fall in three categories: print, distribution and editorial. 10 The profit of the monopolist newspaper is equal to the difference between revenues from selling ad-space to advertisers and production costs:
where c (θ, T ) is the cost of producing T copies of the newspaper when the type of audience is θ.
In the free newspaper industry, the distinction between long-run and short-run costs is relevant. Since we are concerned with a choice of T that is relatively permanent, it makes sense to allow the newspaper to adjust the size of the distribution structure that is appropriate for the desired number of copies. In this sense, c (θ, ·) should be interpreted as a long-run cost function.
We assume that the cost function is strictly increasing and convex, and, for simplicity of exposition, that there are no fixed costs.
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Additionally, we assume that, for a given number of copies, the cost of distributing an additional copy is lower if the audience is favorable (θ = θ H ) than if it is unfavorable (θ = θ L ). Our justification for this assumption is based on the fact that the typical distribution system of a free newspaper is based on hand distributors and self-service racks. These forms of distribution benefit from the willingness of readers to grab a copy of the newspaper. Since distribution costs can represent around 30% of a free 10 In 2010 and 2011, the weights of these categories in the production costs of the free newspapers owned by Metro were, respectively, 52%, 31% and 15% (other costs represented only 3%). Source: Metro International S.A. Annual Report 2011.
11 Our results still hold in the presence of fixed costs (unless these are so high that the newspaper prefers to exit the market).
newspaper's production costs, it is plausible that the goodwill of the audience towards the free newspaper is reflected in significant cost-savings.
Our assumptions regarding production costs are summarized below.
Assumption 3 (Production cost)
The printing and distribution cost function, c (θ, T ), satisfies the following properties:
The problem of the freely distributed newspaper consists in choosing the number of copies, T i , that maximizes its profits, conditional on the type of audience, i ∈ {L, H}, and on the advertisers' expected behavior,
We model this economic setup as a signalling game with the following time structure:
1. Nature selects the type of audience, selecting θ = θ L with probability q L and θ = θ H with probability q H = 1 − q L .
2.
The newspaper privately observes the type of audience, θ i , and chooses a number of copies, T i .
3.
A large number of advertisers offer bids for the N slots of ad-space. As a result of this Bertrand competition, N advertisers buy ad-space at the same price, p i .
4.
The newspaper prints and distributes T i copies, the readership is R(θ i , T i ), the payoff of the newspaper is N p i − c(θ i , T i ) and the payoff of the representative advertiser
To guarantee that the solution is interior, i.e., that the optimal number of copies is strictly positive and finite, we make the following additional assumption.
Assumption 4 (Interior solution)
The advertising return function and the cost function satisfy the following properties:
Before investigating the effect of asymmetric information on the number of copies of the newspaper and on the price of ad-space, we describe (in the following section) the outcome in the case of perfect information.
Benchmark: perfect information
In the case of perfect information, the type of audience is common knowledge of the newspaper and the advertisers.
Given a number of copies, T i , and the type of audience, θ i , the payoff of the representative advertiser is:
As a result of Bertrand competition for the ad-space, the newspaper is able to capture all the surplus from advertisers, who are willing to offer a price that is equal to the benefit that they obtain from advertising:
In the first stage, the newspaper chooses the number of copies that maximizes its profit, π (θ i , T i , p i ) , anticipating the price of the ad-space, p P I i (which is a function of the number of copies):
The solution to this problem is given by the first-order condition:
The superscript P I is used throughout the paper to denote the perfect information outcome.
as the second-order condition, N V T T (θ i , T i ) − c T T (θ i , T i ) < 0, is always verified.
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Therefore, for i ∈ {L, H}, the perfect information solution is given by:
We conclude that, in the perfect information benchmark, advertisers obtain their reservation payoffs, as the monopolist newspaper extracts all their surplus. Furthermore, regardless of the type of readers in the market, the number of copies of the newspaper assures a perfect balance between the marginal benefit of printing an additional copy,
, and the corresponding marginal cost, c T θ i , T
When the audience is favorable, the newspaper prints more copies and charges higher advertising rates than when it is unfavorable. Since
We now turn to the case of asymmetric information, in which the type of audience is private information of the newspaper.
Asymmetric information
This section introduces asymmetric information about readers' characteristics. At the moment of contracting, the newspaper is better informed than the advertisers. While the newspaper knows the true type of the audience, the advertisers only know the prior probability distribution over the set of possible types.
13 Recall that V T T < 0 (by Proposition 1) and c T T ≥ 0 (by Assumption 3).
Deviation from the perfect information contracts
With asymmetric information, the number of copies and the prices of ad-space may differ from the ones obtained in the previous section, T A necessary condition for such a deviation to occur is that the advertisers prefer readers of type H, relatively to readers of type L. In the conditions of Proposition 1, this is always true (we have
14 In this case, the only difference between the two types of audiences is that type L requires a greater distribution cost than type H. Since the type of audience is irrelevant to advertisers, the newspaper has no interest in trying to manipulate their beliefs. Therefore, the newspa- 
is a bit contradictory in the sense that the audience of type H is less willing to read the newspaper, but more willing to obtain a copy. If for some reason such scenario took place, a plausible deviation of the newspaper could consist in choosing T P I L when θ = θ H , for the advertisers to believe that the type of audience is favorable for them.
only if:
If condition (4) is violated, the newspaper does not deviate either for θ = θ H or for θ = θ L . Therefore, the asymmetric information outcome coincides with the perfect information benchmark. In particular, when θ = θ L , the newspaper does not deviate to
because of the high cost of printing and distributing additional copies. It is too costly to make advertisers believe that θ = θ H .
In the rest of the paper, we solve the model for the case in which condition (4) holds. Under this assumption, regardless of the type of readers, the newspaper always prefers the pair T P I H , p
L . Anticipating a deviating behavior, advertisers do not believe that θ = θ H when observing a quantity equal to T P I H . In other words, T P I H is not a credible signal of a favorable audience. Accordingly, when observing T P I H , advertisers retain their priors, and the maximum advertising rate they are willing to pay is equal to the expected benefit that they derive from advertising:
In the following subsection, we find the unique equilibrium of the signalling game presented in section 2, and then we describe the economic implications of the newspaper's equilibrium decisions under asymmetric information.
Solution under asymmetric information
In the context of our signalling game, when the newspaper has private information about the characteristics of the readers, advertisers may try to infer the type of audience from the number of copies of the newspaper. Accordingly, the probabilities that the advertisers use to compute their expected return from buying an ad-insertion are not necessarily their priors but their interim beliefs about the type of readers, conditional on the number of distributed copies chosen by the newspaper.
The advertisers' interim beliefs are described by the belief function µ (θ, T ), which assigns a probability to each possible type (θ L and θ H ), conditionally on the observed number of copies (T ). Of course that, for the probabilities to be well defined, we must
To characterize the newspaper's optimal number of copies and the advertising prices under asymmetric information, we determine the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the signalling game that satisfies the "intuitive criterion" of Cho and Kreps (1987) .
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Below, p(T ) denotes a pure strategy of the representative advertiser, which consists in choosing the bid to make for an ad-insertion, p, as a function of the observed number of copies, T .
Definition 1 (Equilibrium)
A vector of strategies, {(T * L , T * H ) , p * (T )}, and an interim beliefs function, µ(θ, T ), constitute a pure-strategy equilibrium when:
(i) the strategies (T * L , T * H ) and p * (T ) are optimal, given the interim beliefs function,
(ii) the interim beliefs in equilibrium, µ(θ i , T * i ), i ∈ {L, H}, are consistent with Bayes' rule; (iii) the interim beliefs out of equilibrium satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
It is possible to conceive two kinds of equilibria: separating and pooling. In a separating equilibrium, the number of copies chosen by the newspaper depends on the type of readers in the market, i.e., T * L = T * H . Therefore, by observing the contract proposed by the newspaper, advertisers are able to infer the type of the readers in the market. In this case, interim beliefs must correspond to revelation:
In a pooling equilibrium, the quantity chosen by the newspaper is independent of the type of the readers in the market, i.e., T * L = T * H = T . In this case, the quantity does not convey any additional information. Hence, the interim beliefs must coincide with the prior beliefs: µ(θ i , T ) = q i .
As shown and explained by Cho and Kreps (1987) , Cho and Sobel (1990) , and others, when Assumptions 1-4 hold, there is no pooling equilibrium of this game. The unique equilibrium, (T * L , p * L ) and (T * H , p * H ), is the least-cost separating equilibrium, which can be obtained sequentially as follows:
Proposition 3 (Equilibrium)
Under Assumptions 1-4, the unique equilibrium is the least-cost separating equilibrium.
Proof: The proof follows directly from the results obtained by Cho and Sobel (1990) .
It is straightforward to verify that their Assumptions A0, A1, A1', A2, A4, A5 and A6 hold in our model. The fact that the best response of the advertiser, p, is increasing in the probability attributed to the type of readers being H, µ (θ H , T ), plays the role of Assumption A3.
In our definition of equilibrium, we have considered pure strategies. It is also clear, from the results of Cho and Sobel (1990) , that if we allowed for mixed strategies, the unique equilibrium would remain the same.
Characterization of the equilibrium outcome
We have shown that the unique equilibrium is the least-cost separating equilibrium, characterized below (the proof is in the Appendix).
16 Observe that the choice of T * H is subject to a restriction (6) that guarantees that, if θ = θ L , the newspaper does not have any incentive to print T * H copies. An equivalent way to express this condition would be (with some abuse of notation): π (θ L , T
Proposition 4 (Characterization)
The least-cost separating allocation is such that:
(ii) When θ = θ H , the newspaper has a higher profit than when θ = θ L , but not as high as in the case of perfect information, π(θ H , T *
There is an excessive number of copies relatively to the perfect information case, T *
When the audience is unfavorable (θ = θ L ), the optimal contract with asymmetric information, (T * L , p * L ), coincides with the perfect information outcome (the newspaper does not bear any signalling cost).
17 The newspaper captures all the surplus of advertisers, as the price of ads is p *
. Therefore, the chosen circulation, T * L , is the one that maximizes the aggregate surplus of the contracting parties (advertisers and newspaper), being implicitly given by:
In contrast, when condition (4) holds but the audience is favorable (θ = θ H ), the newspaper deviates from the perfect information quantity, T P I H . The newspaper must print more copies than T P I H to credibly signal to the advertisers that the audience is favorable. There is an additional incentive to print and distribute copies of the newspaper which implies that T * H > T P I H . For the chosen quantity, T * H , the marginal revenue of printing and distributing an additional copy of the newspaper is lower than the marginal cost. However, in a context of asymmetric information, the newspaper does not reduce the circulation because, then, advertisers would not be convinced that the audience is favorable. Therefore, when θ = θ H , the profit of the newspaper is lower than in the case of perfect information (there is a signalling cost), while the advertisers remain with their reservation utility, p * H = V (θ H , T * H ). 17 The same result appears in other signalling models, following the seminal work of Spence (1973) .
Welfare implications
In this section, we investigate the welfare implications of the incentives to overprint.
Socially optimal number of copies
We define a social welfare function, W (θ, T ), as the sum of consumers' surplus (assuming a quasi-linear utility funtion), newspaper's profits and an environmental externality.
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Advertisers' profits are not included in the social welfare function because the newspaper extracts all their surplus.
Suppose that the magnitude of the negative environmental externality is described by the function h (θ, T ), with h T (θ, T ) ≥ 0 and h T T (θ, T ) ≥ 0.
Since the profits of the newspaper are equal to N V (θ i , T i ) − c(θ i , T i ), social welfare is given by:
Consumers' surplus is a function of the type of audience and of the number of distributed copies, being denoted by CS (θ, T ). In line with Assumption 1, we assume that it satisfies the following properties:
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For each type of readers, the socially optimal number of copies,
18 Environmental costs that are internalized by markets are supported by the newspaper in the form of a higher production cost. Therefore, only the externality should be included in the social welfare function.
19 There is an extensive literature dealing with the welfare effects of advertising (Butters, 1977; Grossman and Shapiro, 1984; Kaiser and Song, 2009 ; and many others). In our model, since the intensity of advertising is exogenous (N slots), the welfare gain or loss that is associated with advertising is kept fixed (for a given readership) and is included in CS(θ, T ).
given by the first-order condition, ∂W (θ i ,T ) ∂T = 0, which yields:
Welfare properties of the perfect information outcomes
Under perfect information, the number of copies is such that the marginal benefit to advertisers (which is extracted by the newspaper) equals the newspaper's marginal cost of production. Formally, from (3), we have c T θ i , T
The marginal benefit to consumers and the marginal environmental cost are not taken into account. Therefore, unless these exactly compensate each other, the perfect information outcomes, T P I H , p
L , are not socially optimal. There is underprinting if CS T θ i , T
If there is underprinting, the welfare loss can be attributed to the business model of the free newspaper. Since readers do not pay for the newspaper, their marginal utility is not reflected in the price of the good, and, therefore, has no impact on the newspaper's circulation choice. We may say that the utility of reading the newspaper is not internalized in the free newspaper market.
In the presence of an environmental externality, then, from a social welfare perspective, it is not necessarily true that a monopolist newspaper is endowed with insufficient incentives to print. If the environmental externality is very significant, the opposite may even be the case.
Welfare effect of asymmetric information
Now we turn our attention to the welfare impact of asymmetric information. In the case of unfavorable audience (θ = θ L ), the existence of asymmetric information does not affect social welfare because the outcome is the same as under perfect information.
In contrast, when the audience is favorable (θ = θ H ), the newspaper has incentives to print more copies under asymmetric information than in the case of perfect information.
The following proposition summarizes the welfare characterization of such scenario.
Proposition 5 (Welfare analysis)
When we account for the impact of the number of copies on social welfare, for θ = θ H , we observe that circulation is insufficient (resp. excessive) if the positive externality of circulation is stronger (resp. weaker) than the newspaper's signalling cost. More precisely:
, which means that circulation is socially optimal.
Proof. Follows directly from (9), together with (5)-(7).
In the light of the preceding Proposition, we observe that, for θ = θ H , the newspaper's signalling cost is not necessarily welfare-detrimental since this additional incentive to print may be a way to compensate the insufficient incentives to print which arise in the case of perfect information. Whether the effect of asymmetric information on social welfare is positive or negative depends on the relative strength of three countervailing forces: the benefit to consumers associated with the increased number of copies, the negative environmental externality and the signalling cost supported by the newspaper.
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Endogenous ad-space
So far, we have considered that the number of ad-insertions (N ) is an exogenous variable.
However, it is of interest to study the newspaper's choice of ad-space and to verify whether it interferes with the signalling mechanism investigated in the previous section.
Unless readers are neutral with respect to advertising, the number of ads influences readership. Furthermore, it is likely that the impact of an ad-insertion depends on the number of ads. Therefore, if ad-space is endogenous, the advertisers' expected return should be written as a function of the type of audience, the number of distributed copies and the number of ad-insertions: V(θ, T, N ).
With perfect information, the problem of the newspaper is the following:
In the particular case in which V is multiplicatively separable in (θ, T ) and N , i.e., when V(θ, T, N ) = U (θ, T )Z(N ), the number of ad-insertions can be chosen independently of the circulation. In that case, the optimal ad-space can be calculated as:
Since N P I is independent of the type of audience and of the choice of circulation, it can be understood as the fixed number of ad-insertions that we have considered to be exogenous until now. With asymmetric information, the same number of ad-insertions will be chosen.
Even in the general case in which V is not separable in (θ, T ) and N , it is not possible for a newspaper facing a favorable audience to use ad-space as a credible signal, because this signal wouldn't be more costly if the audience was unfavorable.
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21 It is well known that a necessary condition for an action to be a potential signal is that it is more H . Under asymmetric information, the least-cost separating equilibrium can be obtained in the usual way:
Concluding remarks
We have investigated whether, in a context of asymmetric information, a monopolist free newspaper has incentives to print and distribute additional copies with the sole objective of convincing advertisers that the readership of the newspaper is large. Besides shedding some light on a relevant economic issue, we expect that this work may have contributed to the incorporation of asymmetric information in the study of newspaper industries.
Our framework is a signalling model in which the newspaper, knowing whether the potential readership is large or small, chooses the number of copies to print and distribute, providing a signal to the advertisers about the type of readership. In line with the results on the signalling literature (Spence, 1973) , we have found that the newspaper only deviates from the perfect-information solution when the audience is favorable, to convince the advertisers that the audience is, in fact, favorable. When the audience is unfavorable, the newspaper chooses the perfect-information number of copies.
Uncertainty and private information about the audience is also a characteristic of costly for the bad type than for the good type, so that the bad type does not mimic the good type.
other media industries, such as free-to-air TV or internet-based media. However, the signalling mechanism on which we have focused requires some observable action to be less costly for the media firm when the audience is of a favorable type. In the case of free newspapers, the particular method of distribution provides such an action (as long as one accepts that it is less costly to distribute the newpaper if it is highly demanded).
The research question addressed in this paper was partly inspired by some events related to the so-called "London freesheet war". This refers to the very aggressive competition between two free dailies in London: the London Lite and the London Paper, with both newspapers being accused of adopting anti-competitive and predatory strategies. From our viewpoint, one of the most striking episodes of this war occurred in April 2007, when London Lite argued that London Paper vendors were dumping copies of the paper they were distributing in the garbage.
While the endogenous mechanisms we describe in this paper might have played some role in the context of the "London freesheet war", another ingredient should be introduced to better understand these events: competition. In our future research, we aim at considering an oligopoly version of this model to understand the effects of competition on the number of copies of free daily newspapers. We also plan to develop a dynamic version of this model to account for reputation effects. 
Since, by assumption, V θ H , T (ii) Under condition (4), the incentive compatibility restriction in the determination of T * H is binding. Therefore, the newspaper has a higher profit if θ = θ H while the advertisers remain with their reservation utility:
The Lagrangian of the maximization problem that yields T * H is:
The first-order condition is:
Since λ > 0 (the restriction is binding): V T (θ H , T H ) < c T (θ H , T H ).
